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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals a summary judgment dismissal. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the 
respective standards of review: 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment when there was a contested material issue of fact regarding whether 
or not plaintiffs reliance upon defendants' fraudulent representations was unreasonable? 
Preserved for Appeal at 136-149. 
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this case de novo. 
Winegarv. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees in the 
final judgment when no factual or legal basis for them had been presented to the court, 
when the trial court did not award them and when the law does not allow them to be 
awarded? Preserved for Appeal at 136-143, 178-179 and Exhibit A in Addendum. 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is denovo. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Winegar v. Froeren 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused or failed to send i 
Plaintiffs counsel a copy of the signed Judgment, when it refused or failed to consider or 
to rule open Plaintiffs objection to the Judgment, and when it refused to rule upon the 
amount of attorney's fees requested by Defendants. (Preserved for Appeal at 178-179 
and Exhibit A in Addendum. 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is de novo. Winegar v. Froerer. 813 
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
UCA Section 78-27-56 is dispositive and the second issue and of the Judicial 
i 
Rules of the Judicial Administration (CJA) Rules 4-501& 4-504( l)and (2) and URCP 
Rule 58A and Rule 5 Rule 4-501 are dispositive of the third issue. 
• • • . ' •
 i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
 { 
On September 7, 1999 Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had sold 
him a vehicle that they fraudulently and negligently represented, prior to plaintiff signing 
i 
the contract, to have a new engine (TR 1-4). After a year and several months of litigation 
a pretrial conference was held on January 10, 2001 (TR 98). Trial had been set for April 
16, 2001. At the pretrial conference, despite the passing of the dispositive motions cut-
off of October 9, 2000 (TR 94-95), Defendants requested that they be permitted to file a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court trial set aside the motion cut-off date and 
allowed Defendants to file their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed their 
Motion for Summary Judgment on January 12, 2001 and requested a hearing on the 
motion. The motion was fully briefed by both parties on January 29, 2001. Without 
granting oral argument, the trial court issued its ruling on February 22, 2001. The final 
judgment was signed on April 2, 2001. 
Defendants raised three issues in their Motion for Summary Judgment. The first is 
whether or not the merger doctrine and the parol evidence rule defeated Plaintiffs cause 
of action for negligent misrepresentation. Pursuant to Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut 
App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case that was not cited by 
Defendants in their motion, these doctrines do apply to claims for negligent 
misrepresentation. In view thereof Plaintiff conceded that his claim for negligent 
misrepresentation was not well taken and does not appeal the dismissal of this cause of 
action. 
Defendants' other arguments were that Plaintiff could not show, as a matter of 
law, any evidence of: (1) reasonable reliance, or (2) intent to defraud. As to these issues 
the trial court entered its order granting summary judgment against the Plaintiff. The 
trial court's decision was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the current proceeding to the Utah Court of Appeals for further action. 
-3-
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Floyd Maestas ("Maestas'') is a used car salesman for Defendant 4 
Exclusive Cars, Inc. (TR 103). 
2. On December 4, 1998, the Plaintiff purchased a 1991 Toyota truck 
("truck") from Defendants (TR 103). 
3. In conjunction with the sale, Plaintiff executed several documents (TR 
104). v., * • * 
4. The documents indicate that the sale was "AS IS" and NO warranty was 
provided (TR 104) 4 
5. Shortly before the purchase of the truck, Plaintiff alleges that Maestas 
represented that the truck had a new engine. Plaintiff alleges that Maestas further told 
i 
Plaintiff that Dahle Toyota in Logan, Utah, installed the new engine (TR 104). 
6. Plaintiff alleged the truck did not have a new engine (TR 104). 
7. Plaintiff alleged that the truck experienced mechanical failure (TR 104). ' 
8. Plaintiff filed this action asserting two causes of action claims for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation (TR 104). . 
9. When they filed their Motion For Summary Judgment, Defendants provided 
no factual or legal basis supporting an award of attorney's fees or any argument to the 
< 
trial court asserting its alleged right for attorney's fees. The trial court did not award any 
attorney's fees in its memorandum decision and order granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (TR 103-114, 150-168, 172-173). < 
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10. Defendants prepared a proposed judgment including an award of attorney's 
fees. Plaintiff objected to Defendants' proposed judgment granting Defendants attorney's 
fees (TR 176-179, 186-189). 
11. When he purchased the subject vehicle (vehicle), Plaintiff was a 19-year-old 
high school graduate with no experience with automobile mechanics (TR 36, 44, 
138-Larsen Depo. p 5 Ins 4-21, p 65 Ins 3-5). 
12. In November 1998, Plaintiff went to the Defendants' car lot and spoke with 
Defendants' salesperson Nikki on approximately two occasions to discuss the vehicle and 
test drive it. Plaintiff test drove it once and Nikki never indicated it had a new engine. 
On the test drive Plaintiff neither heard or saw anything that would have indicated that 
the engine had any problems (TR 39-40, 138-Larsen Depo. pp 39-43). 
13. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas, a used car salesperson with 
six and a half years experience, represented before the contract was signed that the 
subject vehicle had a new engine (TR 35, 37, 138-Larsen Depo. p 4; p 31 In 3-14). 
14. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas represented that the 
vehicle's new engine had been installed by D. Dahle Toyota of Logan. In fact, Maestas 
wrote the information as part of the contract paperwork on a post-it note and gave it to the 
Plaintiff (TR 38, 42, 58, 138--Larsen Depo. pp 34-35, 57-58). 
* 15. The main reason that Plaintiff agreed to purchase the vehicle at the price 
stated was because it was represented to have a new engine (TR 45, 138-Larsen Depo. p 
77 In 16-25; p 78 In 1-11). 
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16. After Plaintiff took possession of the vehicle, it broke down on December 17, 
1998. There was no indication on the test drive nor when Plaintiff took possession that i 
the engine was not new as represented by Mr. Maestas (TR 39-40, 139 Larsen Depo. pp 
39,43, 45). 
17. It was determined that the vehicle's engine was not new and that it will cost
 f 
between $2,500 and $8,600 to fix (TR 43,139-Larsen Depo. pp 62-63). 
18. In a conversation Mr. Maestas had with Plaintiff in approximately April of 
1999, Mr. Maestas admitted that he had told Plaintiff before he purchased the vehicle that 
the vehicle had a new engine (TR 139, 147-149-Maestas Depo. p 46, Ins 16-18; p 47 In 4 
11-18; p 50 In 6-13). 
19. Mr. Maestas admitted that he would not tell a customer that a vehicle has a 
new engine unless he had the documents to back it up (TR 139, 146—Maestas Depo. p 12 
lns22-25). 
20. The court disregarded the Plaintiffs objection to the award of attorney's fees * 
(TR 178-179) and without notifying Plaintiff or sending Plaintiffs counsel a copy of the 
signed judgment, entered the final judgment. See Exhibit A. 
21. Defendants then submitted an affidavit and order on attorney's fees (TR 190-
234). 
< 
22. Plaintiff objected to the award of attorneys fees and noticed the issue of the 
amount of attorney's fees for decision. See Exhibit A. 
• . - i 
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i 
23. The trial court has refused to render a decision on the contested issue of the 
amount of attorney's fees. See Exhibit A. 
24. The trial court has also failed to provide a complete appellate record of its file. 
See Exhibit A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred when it found, as a matter of law, that Mr. Larsen was 
unreasonable to rely upon the fraudulent representations of the Defendants. This is a 
question of fact that cannot be ruled upon by weighing the evidence as the trial court did 
in summary judgment. Furthermore in Utah, attorney's fees are can be awarded when 
allowed by contract or statute. There was no basis for an award of attorney's fees in this 
case and none should have been awarded. A jury should be allowed to hear the evidence 
and make its determination based thereon. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE & THE MERGER DOCTRINE DO NOT 
APPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTIONS OF FRAUD AND THEREFORE 
THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT ARE IRRELEVANT 
THERETO 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. 56(c); see also Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980); 
.7-
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977). In this case, it will be 
shown that the trial court was incorrect to hold that there were no disputed issues of i 
material fact and misapplied Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1063 
(Utah 1996). 
In Robinson v. Tripco Inv., 2000 Ut App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 
2000), W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23 (Utah 1984), and Berkeley 
Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), and as cited by defendant in Lamb v. 
Bangart 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), the Utah Courts have conclusively stated that: 
All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are merged in < 
and superseded by the subsequent written contract, and unless fraud,... be 
averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties and its terms 
cannot be altered by parol evidence. 
In this case fraud has been averred therefore the merger doctrine and parol I 
evidence rule do not apply. To prove fraud, Plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that: (1) defendant made a representation about the vehicle he sold 
to Plaintiff, (2) the representation concerned a presently existing material fact, (3) the 
representation was false, (4) the Defendants knew the representation was false, or were 
recklessly indifferent as to the truth or falsity of the representation, (5) Defendants' intent 
was induce Plaintiff to buy the vehicle, (6) the Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the 
representation in ignorance of its falsity, (7) Plaintiff relied upon the representation, (8) < 
Plaintiff was induced to act by Defendants misrepresentation, and (9) the Plaintiff has 
been damaged. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Ct. App. Utah 
1987). 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants asserted that, as to these nine 
elements, Plaintiff could not produce evidence of "reasonable reliance" or "intent to 
defraud." The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment solely on the finding 
that the Plaintiff had not "reasonably relied upon" the Defendants' fraudulent 
representation. 
A. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE RELIANCE ON 
DEFENDANTS' MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1987), 
the Court, in setting aside a trial court's dismissal of a fraud action, explained the concept 
of reasonable reliance: 
Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, 
and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Although it is impossible to 
draw precise legal boundaries of when reliance is reasonable, the courts have 
given some directions. Generally, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under 
the circumstance, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge 
and intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve a warning 
that he is being deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own 
investigations.... Reliance also has been found reasonable even where a 
Plaintiff executes a written agreement in reliance upon verbal promises that 
the contrary written provision is not operative, or where a Plaintiff is induced 
to refrain from reading the contract." (Emphasis added). 
In this case, Plaintiff has asserted that Defendants, through defendant Maestas, a 
cars salesperson with six and a half years of experience, made a positive assertion about 
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the vehicle that Mr. Maestas wanted the Plaintiff to purchase, stating that it had a new 
engine. Summary of Facts [SOF] above, ff 5, 13-14. Not only did defendant Maestas i 
represent that the vehicle had a new engine but that the vehicle's new engine had been 
installed by D. Dahle Toyota of Logan. SOF 114. When view in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, this comment added credence to defendant's statement and caused 
Plaintiff to believe Mr. Maestas. Plaintiff did not observe or discover anything when 
inspecting the vehicle or test driving it that would have alerted him that the vehicle's 
engine was not new and that he should conduct an independent investigation. SOF fflf 5, 
12, 13, 16. At the time, Plaintiff was a nineteen-year-old highschool graduate with no < 
experience with automobile mechanics. SOF f 11. At no time during the negotiations or 
in the written contractual paperwork did defendant Maestas ever indicate that his 
i 
representation was false nor did he retract his representation. 
Because of his youth, education, and his non-mechanical background, a jury could 
find that Plaintiffs reliance was reasonable. In fact, it could even be concluded that once * 
he had learned that the vehicle had a new engine, his actions in purchasing the vehicle "as 
is" and declining to purchase a service contract support his reasonably relying on 
Defendants' misrepresentations. A purchaser of a vehicle is likely to believe that a 
vehicle with a new engine or one with low milage is a more safe buy as an "as is" 
i 
purchase. Plaintiff believed Mr. Maestas was telling the truth and nothing that occurred 
tipped him off that he should have distrusted Mr. Maestas. 
In applying "Gold Standard" the trial court stated: i 
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Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas, in fact, represented 
that the vehicle Plaintiff was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether 
it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on that representation without taking 
independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written documents. Plaintiff 
claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding 4 
separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract 
of Sale," which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on 
any used vehicles; (b) a waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to 
purchase an extended warranty plan, and acknowledging that he bore "sole 
responsibility" for any repairs- (c) a document entitled "Buyer's Guide" (also 
referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle 
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated 
that no systems were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in 
capital letters indicated "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE 
DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement below that stating "Nothing else 
promised, implied, or expressed." Moreover, although Plaintiff had been advised 
by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written 
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which 
was not directly responded to. To the extent that Plaintiff s request yielded some 
information (i.e., the name of the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), 
Plaintiff then failed to follow-up on the information he was provided orally. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard supra, conclusively 
resolves the question of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of 
[Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party 
in light of contrary written information. No matter how naive or inexperienced 
[Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept unquestioningly any 
representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation and 
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard 
915 P.2d at 1068 (citing Rubeyv.Wood 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). 
"The one who complains of being injured by.. .false representation cannot 
heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising such 
degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own 
neglect." Gold Standard. at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 
P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)). Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags" 
which he chose to disregard. Having done so, he must deal with the 
"consequences of his own neglect." 
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The facts of Gold Standard are very different from those in this case and were 
misapplied by the trial court. In Gold Standard the parties, "GSI and Getty/' were two I 
sophisticated business entities, that, "consistently dealt with each other at arm's length." 
In Gold, GSI, was told explicitly in subsequent writings that the oral representations 
I 
made in earlier discussions by Getty were no longer valid. As stated above, in this case 
defendant Maestas never retracted his representations that the vehicle had a new engine. 
Plaintiff, an unsophisticated teen, with no mechanical experience believed him. 
Moreover, unlike Gold Standard the paperwork Plaintiff signed did not ever indicate that 
the vehicle did not have a new engine, it merely indicate the purchase was "AS IS" with j 
no warranties. 
If Gold Standard were applicable to Plaintiff's case, the Defendants would have 
i 
had to have put in the paperwork that the affirmative assertion that Mr. Maestas's earlier 
representation that the car had a new engine was false and should not have been relied on 
by the Plaintiff. Since there was no information that Plaintiff had been given indicating * 
that Mr. Maestas was defrauding him, there was no duty to make further inquiries or to 
follow through and obtain the paperwork as suggested by Plaintiff's brother-in-law. 
Admittedly, probably the fact most favorable to Defendants' position is that one of 
the documents that Plaintiff signed stating, "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING 
ON THE DEALER!" Nonetheless, if this statement would mean as a matter of law that 




Maestas. Plaintiff, would submit that because of the "averred fraud" that this written 
statement would still not indicate that there is no disputed material fact. 
The facts of this case are more similar to Cardiomed., Inc. In Cardiomed. Inc. vs. 
Tripco Investment Inc., 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case decided after 
Gold Standard. In Cardiomed the court stated that: 
[T]o determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance 'must be 
considered with reference to the facts of each case.' Conder, 739 P.2d at 638. In 
general, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts 
should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has 
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being 
deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. Id. . . . 
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case, we cannot say as a 
matter of law that Cardiomed was unreasonable in its reliance on Tripp's 
statements regarding the structural integrity of the building. Viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to Cardiomed, they demonstrate that Robinson walked 
through the building with Tripp before Cardiomed purchased it. Robinson 
questioned Tripp regarding some problems he observed and Tripp responded that 
he had been involved in the construction and engineering of the building, and that 
the building had no structural defects. To support that claim, Tripp then provided 
Robinson with an inspection report that failed to note any structural problems with 
the building. Simply stated, because Tripp held himself out as someone with 
superior knowledge of the building and then lent support to his representations 
by providing an inspection report, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Cardiomed1 s reliance was reasonable. Accordingly, because there 
were genuine issues of material fact regarding the three elements of fraud relied 
upon, summary judgment on that cause of action was improperly granted. 
Similarly, Mr. Maestas, held himself out as someone with superior knowledge of 
the vehicle's condition and categorically stated that the vehicle had a new engine, thus 
justifying the requested purchase price. Mr. Meaestas went so far as to represent M. 
Dahle's as the place where the new engine had been installed. When viewing the facts in 
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the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, based upon the "[Plaintiffs'] knowledge and 
intelligence," and the fact that, as Plaintiff testified that he never "discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he [was] being deceived," it was reasonable for 
him to rely on Mr. Maestas' misrepresentation. 
The facts of this case are also more similar to Semenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578, 
(Utah 1999) another case decided after Gold Standard. In Semenov. the court stated that: 
Hill contends that, as a matter of law, SemenoVs allegations cannot support a 
claim of misrepresentation. He asserts that the documentation available at the 
closing showed the business to be losing money and that Semenov could not 
have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the contrary. Hill 
relies on our decision in Gold Standard as disposing of SemenoVs claim that 
language difficulties can create a triable issue of fact that would be material to a 
fraud claim. Hill relies on the statement in Gold Standard that "under the law of 
this state, a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing 
party in light of contrary written information" to support his claim that a dispute 
over SemenoVs English proficiency is not a dispute over a "material" fact. 915 
P.2datl068. 
Gold Standard is inapposite. That case did not involve a party asserting a 
language deficiency; rather, it involved two sophisticated parties proficient in 
English. Here, the question of SemenoVs language capability is material to his 
fraud claim. It is true that the general rule pertaining to acceptance of an offer by 
signing is that "where a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that 
he did not know its terms, and in the absence of fraud or mistake he will be 
bound by all its provisions, even though he has not read the agreement and does 
not know its contents." 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41(f) (1963) (emphasis added); see 
also id. § 139; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 157 cmt. b (1981). However, 
it is also true that f,the illiteracy of a party has an important bearing on the 
question of the existence of fraud in procuring [a] signature." 17 C.J.S. 
Contracts § 139 (1963). SemenoVs English proficiency or the lack thereof is a 
material fact that "should be considered in determining whether or not he has 
been defrauded." Id. 
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Because Semenov and Hill disagree on the state of SemenoVs English 
proficiency at the time of the closing, a factual dispute exists which must be 
resolved by a jury or a judge after an evidentiary hearing. Our decision to remand 
this case is consistent with Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines Inc.. where a New Jersey 
court overturned a summary judgment in favor of the defendant and held that a 
jury should decide whether an uneducated and illiterate non-English-speaking 
Plaintiff should be bound to a release form he signed with an airline when the 
contents of the writing were unknown to him. 12 N.J. Super. 490, 79 A.2d 880, 
883 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). 
Again, similarly, Defendants claim that, "the documentation available at the 
closing [of the sale of the car] showed the [car was sold as is with no warranties] and 
that [Plaintiff] could not have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the 
contrary. Nevertheless, like Semenov's illiteracy, Plaintiff was an unsophisticated 
nineteen year old. Morover, unlike this case, in Semenov. the court noted that the Gold 
Standard case "involved two sophisticated parties proficient in English. Here, the 
question of [Plaintiffs inexperience] is material to his fraud claim." 
B. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD OR DECEIVE. 
To maintain a cause of action for fraud Plaintiff must prove that Maestas either 
knew his representation was false or made the representation recklessly knowing that 
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation. 
In Galloway v. AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. Utah 1989) the 
court stated that: 
Intentional fraud generally requires a showing of intent to deceive, that is, the 
misrepresenter's intent to induce the victim's reliance on the false representation. 
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The intent to deceive, required for common law fraud, may be inferred where 
a misrepresentation is voluntarily communicated to the victim with knowledge 
that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false but knowing that 
the victim is likely to rely on it Thus . . . it is sometimes said that a "reckless" 
misrepresentation, made "knowing that the [the misrepresenter] had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such a misrepresentation" is tantamount to the 
intent to deceive. 
Also, in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), the court favorably cited an 
Idaho case for the holding that under the doctrine of constructive fraud the vendor of 
goods or land has a special duty to know the truth of his representations and is presumed 
to know the facts to which his representations relate. Consequently, a misrepresentation 
made by such a vendor is fraudulent even if not made knowingly, willfully or with actual 
intent to deceive. 
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he made several trips to the Defendants' car lot. In 
his first trips he dealt with salesperson Nikki who never mentioned that the vehicle had a 
new engine. Then after several negotiations in which Plaintiff insisted that the price was 
too high, Mr. Maestas then indicated that the vehicle had a new engine. In his depostion, 
Mr. Maestas acknowledged that he would not make such a representation unless he had 
documents to back himself up. Hence, he himself establishes fact that if Plaintiff s 
assertions are found to be true by the Jury, his actions were at the very least reckless. 
It is well understood in our mobile society that an engine is an integral part of an 
automobile. Mr. Maestas, a used car salesperson for many years, knew that this 
misrepresentation would clinch the deal and induce Mr. Larsen to agree to purchase the 
automobile at the higher purchase price. Hence, "the intent to deceive, required for 
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common law fraud, may be inferred where a misrepresentation is voluntarily 
communicated to the victim . . . without knowing whether it is true or false but 
knowing that the victim is likely to rely on it." 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Generally, attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a 
contract or statute. See Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985); And pursuant 
to UCA 78-27-56 attorney's fees may be awarded under very particular circumstances. 
The Defendants never made any legal or factual argument regarding why they should be 
awarded attorney's fees nor did the court indicate why she signed an order granting 
attorney's fees over Plaintiffs objections. Since there is no basis for an attorney's fee 
award they should not have been awarded. 
ni. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED OR 
FAILED TO SEND PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL A COPY OF THE SIGNED 
JUDGMENT, WHEN IT REFUSED OR FAILED TO CONSIDER OR TO 
RULE OPEN PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE JUDGMENT, AND 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO RULE UPON THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS. 
The trial court did not award attorney's fees in its memorandum Decision and 
Order. Defendants submitted a proposed judgment with an award of attorney's fees. The 
Plaintiff objected to the judgment. Rule 4-504(1) of the Judicial Rules of the Judicial 
Administration (CJA) requires that any proposed judgment be "in conformity with the 
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i 
ruling," of the trial court. This rule prevents parties from overreaching and protects the 
court's reasoning process. i 
Plaintiff objected to the proposed judgment, but the trial court completely 
disregarded the Plaintiff's objection and signed the proposed judgment on March 30, 
2001 but did not send it to Plaintiff. Plaintiff had to obtain a copy from the defendants. 
Rule 4-504(2) of CJA allows a party to object to a proposed judgments. The trial court 
should have therefore considered the objection before entering the order. When judgment 
is entered, Rule 4-504(2) of the Judicial Rules of the Judicial Administration, URCP Rule 
58A and URCP Rule 5 require the trial court to serve a copy of a signed judgment be on ( 
all the parties. This procedural rule has the intent of providing the parties sufficient 
notice to cease possibly unnecessary legal proceedings and preparations that may be 
rendered moot because of the entry of judgment. More importantly, these rules also 
ensure that the parties can effectively secure their appellate rights by filing a timely 
notices of appeal. To rule otherwise will require parties to call the court's every day to * 
determine if a decision has been rendered. 
The trial court did not do this. However, because of Plaintiff's counsel's prior 
experience with this trial court, he filed a Notice of Appeal before the actual entry of the 
final judgment and several times thereafter as a prophylactic measure. TR 180, 237 
After the entry of the final judgment, Defendants then submitted an affidavit and 
order on attorney's fees. Plaintiff objected to the award and noticed the issue of the 
amount of attorney's fees for decision. The trial court has refused to render a decision on \ 
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this issue. The trial court has also failed to provide a complete appellate record of its file. 
This again violates Rule 4-501 of the CJA and violates the ethical rules which require 
trial court judges to be diligent in their disposition of matters before them. 
Plauitifl7appellant would urge this court to require trial courts to adhere to the 
proper civil procedures by providing notice of the entry of final judgments, to consider all 
objections and motions filed with the court and to make expeditious rulings of issues 
presented to it. Failure to do this should be deemed as sanctionable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial 
court and that he be allowed to proceed with his cause of action for fraud. 
DATED this 3 * day of January, 2002. 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC. 
/ ^ 
*—Loren M. Lambert 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on 
January *-/ , 2002, postage prepaid to: 
Nick J. Colessides 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (969) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, # 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 Jf^?/ -*fl/$%< 
Attorney for Defendants 
Exclusive Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY L. LARSEN : 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 




: Case NO.: 99 04 08099 
: Judge: Denise P. Lindberg 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment having come 
regularly for consideration and decision before the Honorable 
Denise P. Lindberg, and the Court having received the submissions 
of the parties, to-wit: Memoranda and attached exhibits thereto 
in support of each party's respective position, and the Court 
having considered the submission of the parties, and the Court 
having made and entered its Decision and Order on Defendants' \ 








are incorporated herein by this reference, and the Court having 
found that plaintiff Wesley L. Larsen did not act reasonably in 
relying upon the oral representations of defendant Floyd Maestas, 
despite having been provided with many red flags and ignoring the 
same, and plaintiff failing to follow up in an inquiry to 
determine the veracity of the information orally presented by 
defendant Maestas, and plaintiff having received from the 
defendant dealer four separate and distinct documents disclaiming 
any oral representations, and the Court having entered its order 
granting defendants their motion for summary judgment, and good 
cause otherwise appearing therefor, now therefore, upon the 
motion of Nick J. Colessides, attorney for defendants Exclusive 
Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's 
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action, and that defendants are hereby entitled to and 
shall recover money judgment against plaintiff for defendants' 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with 
the defense of this matter, the same to be presented to the Court 
by an affidavit of defendants' counsel, and for augmentation of 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On March 24, 2001, counsel for defendants shall file the 
original of the foregoing Judgment with the Clerk of the Court, 
addressed as follows: 
CLERK'S OFFICE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
210 WEST 10000 SOUTH 
SANDY UTAH 84070 
A copy of the foregoing has been served to plaintiff's attorney-
addressed as follows: 
MR LOREN M LAMBERT ESQ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
266 EAST 7200 SOUTH 
MIDVALE UTAH 84047 
via hand delivery; 
via fax: 801.352-0645 
y via first class mail 
-/<-
postage pre-paid, this day of March, 2 0 01 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY L.LARSEN, ; 
PlaintifF, ) 
vs. 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a ] 
Utah corporation, and FLOYD ] 
MAESTAS, 
Defendants. 
I DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civ. No. 990408099 
Defendants have moved this Court for Summary Judgment and filed a Memorandum of Law in 
support of their motion. Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have replied to Plaintiffs < 
opposition. Defendants have requested oral argument. However, after reviewing the parties' 
submissions and applicable case law, it is the Court's view that the dispositive issue governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. Accordingly, oral argument is 
not necessary. 
( 
Plaintiffs complaint alleged both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. In his opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff conceded that under the authority 
of Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut. App. 200, his claim for negligent misrepresentation "must 
fail." Consequently the only issues for the Court are whether (1) there are material issues of fact 
that preclude summary judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, or (2) if no material < 
issues of fact are in dispute, whether Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56. 
Plaintiff has agreed with Defendants' statement of undisputed facts. In his opposition, however, 
Plaintiff raises additional factual statements, some of which (paragraphs 1-3) are accepted without
 ( 
dispute by Defendants, others of which (paragraphs 4-8) are disputed in whole or in part by 
Defendants. The Court hereby incorporates by reference all the undisputed facts noted in 
Defendants' and Plaintiffs memoranda. Furthermore, for purposes of ruling on this motion the 
Court accepts as true Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts. Notwithstanding this assumption, 
the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants must prevail.
 { 
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action (for fraudulent misrepresentation) requires that Plaintiff 
establish the following elements: (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact, (3) which was false, and (4) which the representor either knew to be false, 
or made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did, in fact, rely upon it, (8) and was 
thereby induced to act, (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold Standard Inc.. v. Getty Oil 
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). This Court is mindful that "[w]hile the question of reasonable 
reliance is usually a matter within the province of the jury. . . there are instances where courts 
may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." Id The Court holds as 
a matter of law that, on the facts of this case, it was not reasonable for Plaintiff to act as he did. 
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas,in fact, represented that the vehicle Plaintiff 
was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on 
that representation without taking independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written 
documents. Plaintiff claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding 
4 separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale," 
which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on any used vehicles; (b) a 
waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to purchase an extended warranty plan, and 
acknowledging that he bore "sole responsibility" for any repairs; (c) a document entitled "Buyer's 
Guide" (also referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle 
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated that no systems 
were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in capital letters indicated "ORAL 
PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement 
below that stating "Nothing else promised, implied, or expressed." Moreover, although Plaintiff 
had been advised by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written 
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which was not directly 
responded to. To the extent that Plaintiffs request yielded some information (i.e., the name of 
the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), Plaintiff then failed to follow-up on the 
information he was provided orally. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively resolves the question 
of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of [Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely 
upon oral statements by the opposing party in light of contrary written information. No matter 
how naive or inexperienced [Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept 
unquestioningly any representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation 
and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard, 915 P.2d 
at 1068 (citing Rubevv. Wood. 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). "The one who complains of 
being injured by . . . false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but 
has the duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised 
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." Gold 
Standard, at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)). 
Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags" which he chose to disregard. Having 
done so, he must deal with the "consequences of his own neglect." 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTEI^fi^^^t^is disposition, the trial 
dates are stricken. So ordered. 
Dated this 21* day of February, 2001. 
/ > NS 
Denise 
i 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 990408099 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail NICK J COLESSIDES 
ATTORNEY 
466 So. 400 East, Suite #100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84111-3303 
Mail LOREN LAMBERT 
ATTORNEY 
266 E 7200 S 
MIDVALE UT 84047 
Dated this day of <7^ 
Page 1 (last) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY L. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, AFFIDAVIT OF LOREN M. LAMBERT 
vs.. Case No. 20010272CA 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an Priority No. 15 
individual, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
AFFroAVIT OF LOREN M. LAMBERT 
NICK J. COLESSIDES LOREN M. LAMBERT No. 5101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 266 East 7200 South 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. i 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW LOREN M. LAMBERT, being first duly sworn, states the following: 
i 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff in this case. 
2. Because of past experience with the Third District Court of Utah, Sandy 
Department failing or refusing to send me notices of when final judgments have been entered and 
a copy of the judgment, I filed several Notices of Appeal in this case. The first one was sent after 
the trial judge issued her memorandum decision and order. 
3. After I received the defendants' proposed judgment, I filed an objection to it. I 
objected to the language granting defendants attorney's fees. The judge then, without addressing 
my objection, signed the proposed judgment and in fact did not notify me thereof or send me the 
signed judgment. I had to get a copy of the signed judgment from the opposing counsel, which 
was faxed to me (attached as Exhibit 1). 
4. After I filed my first Notice of Appeal and after the proposed judgment was signed 
and entered by the trial court, the defendants submitted an affidavit of attorney's fees. I then 
objected to the amounts of attorney's fees being requested (attached as Exhibit 2). I sent a Notice 
to Submit a decision thereon on that this issue could be resolved prior to the briefing of this 
appeal (attached as Exhibit 3). For some reason unbeknownst to us, the judge and the trial court 
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failed to make the Notice a part of the Trial Record and are refusing or failing to make a ruling on 
this issue. 
5. I had directed my office personnel to inquire several times whether a decision had 
been made on attorneys fees and whether a decision would ever be made. The trial court 
indicated to my assistant, Frances M. Wyss that a decision thereon would not be rendered. Please 
see Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5, the Affidavit of Frances M. Wyss. 
6. I have brought to this same court this same problem in Oseguera v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. Supreme Court Case Nos. 20010037-SC 990410525. Also in Silvia Nunez 
v. Dominic Albo, MP.. Supreme Court Case No. 20010037-CA, an issue arose in which the trial 
court signed a proposed judgment that included conclusions that had not been made by the trial 
court. 
DATED this ^> day of January, 2002. 
^z 
On the ^ day of January, 2002, before me personally appeared LOREN M. 
LAMBERT, to me known to be the person named herein and who executed the foregoing 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this *ft day of January, 2002, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LOREN M. LAMBERT was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
bu uw£nf>wo r 
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INICK U . U O L E S S I D E S 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
4 6 6 SOUTH 4 0 0 EAST, # IOO 





Via f a x : 
Re: 
TELEPHONE: (801)521 -444 I 
FAX: (801) 52 1-4452 
E-MAIL AOORESS. n j c o l e s s i d e 3 6 m s n . c o m 
Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet 
* / 
A/. ZJ££I; /-Ju^&Zf 
1f^ 06Y±~ 
Total pages including this transmittal page: 
If you do not receive the entire transmission please, call 
The information contained in this transmission is pnvilcgcd and confidential, it is intended Tor the use of 
the individual or entity named above. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution, or copying of this 
communication is strictly prohibited If you have received this fax communication in error please 
immediately notify this office by telephone, collect if necessary, and return the original message to this 
office at the above address via U S. Postal Service. Thank you. 
MESSAGE 
JfJ /?&Z Y*"4- S?£J~'&-S 7 
D;\WPD0C$\K\r*x irdft.n. lin.wptf 
s~ 
/ 
KICK J. COLESSIDES (965) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, # iOO 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 64111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 ^^/ -*/*/$%> 
Attorney for Defendants 
Exclusive Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 




EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.. a Utah 
corporation, aiid FLOYD : 
MAESTAS, 
; Case NO.: 93 04 0BC99 
Defendants. 
Judge: Denise P. LindDerg 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment having cone 
regularly for consideration and decision before the Honorable 
Denise P. Lindberg, and the Court having received the submissions 
of the parties, to-wjt; Memoranda and attached exhibits thereto 
in support of each party's respective position, and the Court 
having considered the submission of the parties, and the Court 
having made and entered its Decision and Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judqmenc, which decision, order, and findings, 
are incorporated herein by this reference, and the Court having 
found that plaintiff Wesley L. Larsen did not act reasonably in 
relying upon the oral representations of defendant Floyd Maestas, 
decpite having been provided with many red flags and ignoring the 
same, and plaintiff failing to follow up in an inquiry to 
determine the veracity of the information orally presented by 
defendant Maestas, and plaintiff having received from the 
defendant dealer four separate and distinct documents disclaiming 
any oral representations, and the Court having entered its order 
granting defendants tHeir motion for summary judgment, and good 
cause otherwise appearing therefor, now therefore, upon the 
motion of Wick J. Colessidc3, attorney for defendants Exclusive 
Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas, 
IT IS H2RE3Y ORDERED, DECPEED, A.ND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's 
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action, <?nd that defendants are hereby entitled to and 
shall recover money judgment against plaintiff for defendants' 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with 
the defense of this matter, the same to be presented to the Court 
by an affidavit of defendants' counsel, and for augmentation of 




Bated this , 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
On March 24, 2001, counsel for defendants shall file the 
original of the foregoing Judgment with the Clerk of the Court, 
addressed as follows: 
CLBRK'S OFFICE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
210 WEST 10000 SOUTH 
SANDY UTAH 84070 
A copy of the foregoing has been served to plaintiff's attorney 
addressed as follows: 
MR LOREN M LAMBERT ESQ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2 £6 EAST 7200 SOUTH 
MIDVALE UTAH 84 047 
via hand delivery; 
, via fax: 801.352-0645 
_>L_ via first class mail 




LOREN M. LAMBERT (5101) 
Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Tele: (801) 568-0041 
Fax: (801)352-0645 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY L. LARSEN : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and FLOYD MAESTAS 
Defendants, 
VERIFIED OBJECTION TO 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Case NO.: 99 04 08099 
Judge Lindberg 
Pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 plaintiff objects to defendant's attorney's fees affidavit. 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant's request for attorney's fees is not allowed under Utah law, is 
excessive, and if having been awarded pursuant to UCA 78-27-56, it should not be awarded 
pursuant to subsection (2) (a) and (b). This objection is based upon attorney Lambert's 
experience of over 13 years of trial work. He has associated with dozens of attorneys, some from 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; and Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer. Perhaps Mr. Lambert has not encountered an attorney of the calibre of Mr. Collessides 
and would acknowledge that he has demonstrated zealous competence and effectiveness in this 
case; however from the numerous attorney fees requests that Mr. Lambert has addressed he has 
never experienced such an excessive fee as that sought by defendants. 
Since the court has never indicated the basis for its award of attorney's fees, plaintiff 
assumes it was because the court found plaintiffs action to be without merit or asserted in bad 
faith. This assumption is made because plaintiff is unaware of any other basis for the court's 
award. If this is not the case, no attorney's fees are warranted under any theory. 
1. Defendants' Request is Excessive 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was based upon the "As Is" language of the 
purchasing documents of the case. At the onset of this case Defendants' had in their possession 
all of the information and evidence used in their motion. Therefore their motion could have been 
filed prior to filing an answer. This would have avoided the bulk of the incurred attorney's fees. 
Also, defendants' counsel missed a scheduling conference because of health problems and 
missed court deadlines and therefore had to petition the court for extension, causing further 
delays and additional attorney's fees. 
Defendants' counsel's billing rate of $210 is extortionate in a case of this nature. 





Mr. Dunlap asserts that he spent 39.70 hours preparing the motion for summary 
judgment. Plaintiffs counsel has prepared and responded to several hundred motions for < 
summary judgment and would assert that it would not take this amount of time to prepare such a 
motion. 
On 9-29-199 defendants' attorney asserts that it took .7 hours to file and mail an answer. 
It takes no more than 10 minutes to accomplish this. On 10-25-1999, Defendants' attorney 
asserts that it took 6.1 hours to prepare a discovery request. It takes no more than an hour and a 
half minutes to accomplish this. On 12-29-1999, Defendants' attorney asserts that it took 1.5 
hours to prepare a Notice of Deposition. It takes no more than 10 minutes to accomplish this. 
On 1-4-00 & 1-26-00, Defendants' attorney charged travel time to the library to research 
a motion in limine. Attorneys do not charge for travel time to do research since they have access 
to on-line or computer disk research. It is inconceivable that an attorney that bills at $210 an 
hour does not have access to computer-based research. On 1-4-00 Defendants' attorney asserts 
that it took 1.5 hours reviewing plaintiffs request for discovery and sending copies to 
defendants. It should have taken no more than 25 minutes to accomplish this. On 4-18-2000, 
Defendants' attorney asserts that it took 5.5 hours to simply review plaintiffs responses to 
interrogatories, a documents request, and two other small documents. It should have taken no 
more than 20 minutes to have done this. Plaintiffs counsel has reviewed all of the documents 
and pleadings referred to by defendants' attorney and that only the most inefficient attorneys 
3 
could have billed this many hours to accomplish these tasks. 
On 1-10-01 Defendants' attorney asserts that it took 2.3 hours to appear at a scheduling 
conference. Plaintiff registered one hour for this conference, including travel time. On 3-22-01 
and shortly thereafter, Defendants' attorney asserts that it took 1.9 hours to review plaintiffs 
Notice of Appeal, review a letter from the supreme court and review a docketing statement. 
Such task should have only taken at the most one half hour. 
On 6-17-01 Defendants' attorney asserts that it took .3 hours to review "and analyze a 
judgment signed by Judge Lindberg. Defendant's counsel had prepared this judgment for the 
court and it was a page and a half long. The court made no changes to the judgment. Why 
would defendants' counsel need to analyze a judgment he prepared? 
Defendants request that plaintiff pay for messenger service by LMI. This expense was 
incurred by defendants because defendants were late and would miss a court deadline due to their 
lack of planning. This is not a proper cost. 
2. Attorney's fees should be waived. 
Plaintiff has on file with the court an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. Therefore, pursuant to 
UCA 78-27-56,(2) (a) and (b), this court should not award attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that no attorney's fees be awarded. 
4 
< 
DATED t h i s 3 d day of 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1
 ,2001. 
^-fcoren M. Lamb orney for Plaintiff 
On the day of ALKJUA^ , 2001, before me personally appeared to me Loren 
M. Lambert known to be the person nanibd herein and who executed the foregoing document and 
stated he had read, understood and voluntarily executed the same. He further verifies that to the 
best of his personal knowledge the facts asserted above are true. 
My Commissiuu Expiie^' 
FRANCES M. WYSS 
NOTARYPU8UC* STATE OF UTAH 
1090 LORI WAY 





I hereby certify that on 
document was mailed postage prepaid 
NICK J. COLESSIDES 
Attorneys at Law 
466 South 400 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
^ A X L M ^ A t ) l a true a n ( i correct copy of the foregoing 





LOREN M. LAMBERT, No. 5101 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 568-0041 
Fax:(801)352-0645 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY L. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT RE 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 99-04-08099 
Hon. Denise P. Lindberg 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF and requests that the court submit for decision Defendants' 
Request for Attorney's Fees. 
DATED this f ./day of September, 2001. 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
^—Loren M. L i b e r t 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1 / day of September, 2001, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT RE DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 











FOF^ /^p&Ml p DATE ty/77 TIMEjfl P.M. 
J* taiMjui y>cu<4(i* -UTUAJ^--
QF g iCt^^/^^^ Y\JXA 
PHONE ^ z ) FAX /] >t_ 
 ^ A ,  
^^d^f- \\^qc,o\ -£, 
\AA 
I 1 j * Q ] RETURNED YOUR CALL 
t w . UU?~% m*2&&tA 
A I ) | | WILL C t^Q-AGAIN 
</^>J? .fei##Wt 
SIGNED 3? 
WILL C^LL AGAIN 
'fot* 
WANTS TO SEE YOU 
^e^vcv <W-0H-tf&*t4 
5 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY L. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCES M. WYSS 
vs.. Case No. 20010282-CA 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FLOYD MAESTAS, an Priority No. 15 
individual, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCES M. WYSS 
NICK J. COLESSIDES LOREN M. LAMBERT No. 5101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 266 East 7200 South 
Telephone: 521-4441 Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone 801-568-0041 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW FRANCES M. WYSS, being first duly sworn, states the following: 
•1. I am a paralegal for Loren M. Lambert, Plaintiffs attorney in this case. 
2. Over the past several months, Mr. Lambert had asked all of his office staff to call 
the Sandy Division of the Third District Court regarding the above case. Several of Mr. 
Lambert's staff have called many times to inquire about the status of this case. 
3. I know of one specific time that I called to inquire about the status. I spoke with 
Bonnie at the Sandy District Court on 11/14/01. She read to me from their files the following 
information: "On October 31, 2001 the following was entered in the docket: 'There appears to 
be some sort of objection to the proposed judgment against W Larsen. That appears to have been 
sent north. Without that, because it involves a matter currently on appeal, I think it's not a 
judgment that can be signed.'" Bonnie then told me it was signed by Judge Lindberg. 
4. Our office has not received any written notice of this information from the Sandy 
District Court. 
DATED this j day of January, 2002. 
(jUugjA 
Frances M. Wyss 
-2-
I 
On the -5 day of January, 2002, before me personally appeared FRANCES M. WYSS, 
to me known to be the person named herein and who executed the foregoing Affidavit and that 
the statements contained therein were true and correct to the best of her knowledge. 
LOREN M LAMBERT 
mtatyPubfc State of Utah 
266 EA81" 7200 SOUTH 
MIDVALE. UT 84047 
COMNL EXP. 11-16-2002 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this t day of January, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCES M. WYSS was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
f fxJUOUtJ MlC/fO° 
-3-
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the 
proceedings in the district court. 
